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IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE
"TERMINATOR" TECHNOLOGY
CONTROVERSY: INTEL .ECTUAL
PROPERTY PROTECTIONS FOR
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED SEEDS AND
THE RIGHT TO SAVE AND REPLANT SEED
Abstract: Throughout history, farmers have engaged in the practice of
saving seed from each harvest to use in planting the following year's crap.
This practice, however; has been a significant concern for those developing
new varieties of seed. The "terminator" technology was developed to prevent
the saving and replanting of genetically engineered seeds by blocking the
germination of these seeds after one growing season. The terminator tech-
nology, however; caused worldwide controversy over the scope of intellectual
property protections for genetically engineered seeds used in agriculture be-
cause farmers believed that seeds incorporating the terminator technology
would interfere with the traditional and historical right to save and replant
seed. This Note argues that use of the terminator technology in genetically
engineered seeds would be an effective way to enforce existing intellectual
property protections and that public property doctrines would fail to recog-
nize a common law right to save and replant seed.
INTRODUCTION
Advancements in the genetic engineering of plants important to
agriculture and the proliferation of the sale of genetically engineered
seeds have created unique problems for seed developers interested in
protecting their biological innovations.' The seed by its very nature
presents an enormous biological obstacle to seed developers—when a
farmer plants a genetically engineered seed, the seed will produce a
plant that will in turn produce more genetically engineered seed.2
Seed developers have been concerned that they spend enormous
amounts of time and financial resources in developing genetically en-
I See Frederick H. Buttcl & Jill Belsky, Biotechnology, Plant Breeding, and Intellectual Mop-
erty: Social and Ethical Dimensions, in OWNING SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION,
VALUE AND ETHICAL 1SSUES- 110, 110 (Vivian Weil & John W. Snapper eds., 1989).
2 See R.C. Lewontin, The Maturing of Capitalist Agriculture: The Farmer as Proletarian,
MONTHLY REv.,July 1, 1998, at 72.
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gineered crop varieties, yet farmers are allowed to use the seeds har-
vested from these crops in future seasons without paying for them. 3
On March 3, 1998, the United States Patent and Trademark
Office granted Patent No. 5,723,765, titled "Control of Plant Gene
Expression," jointly to the United States Department of Agriculture
("USDA") and the Delta and Pine Land Co. ("D&PL") for a technol-
ogy that blocks genetically altered seeds from germinating after one
season.4 This new technology, officially named the "Technology Pro-
tection System," provides the ability to genetically alter seeds so that
the crops produced from these seeds will in turn bear sterile seeds. 5
This innovation has been nicknamed the "terminator" technology by
critics, due to the fact that it results in a cessation of a plant's repro-
duction process.6
 Seeds that incorporate the terminator technology
would look and grow like normal seeds—the only difference is that
the seeds would lack germination capabilities.? Although there are
legal protections in the United States available to seed developers in-
terested in preventing farmers from saving genetically engineered
5 See Nigel fla•kes, IVar on Killer Seed, 'rims (London), Nov. 4, 1998, at '20.
4 See "Control of Plant Gene Expression," U.S. Patent No. 5,723,765; Danielle Knight,
Science-Rights: New Seed Technology Threatens Farmers, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar, 31, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 5986450; Bill Lambrecht, Critics Vilify New Seed Technology that Monsanto
May Soon Control—"Terminator" Would Prevent Saving Seeds by Making them Ste,* S'r. Lows
PosT-DISPATCH, Nov. I, 1998, at Al. The patent for this technology is enormous in
scope—it covers all seeds and could be incorporated into the seeds of all major crops. See
Leora Broydo, A Seedy Business: A New "'Terminator" Technology tVill Mahe Craps Sterile and Force
Farmers to Buy Seed More Often..–So Why Did the USDA Invent It?, MoJo WIRE (Apr. 7, 1998)
<http://www.motherjones.com/news_wire/broydo.litml >.
5 See Danielle Knight, Environment: U.S. Biotech Giant Patents on "Terminator Technology,"
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 19, 1998, available in 1998 WL 19901054.
° See M. Ahmed, Terminator III, BUSINESS STANDARD, May 22, 1998, at 6. The name
"terminator" was coined by Patrick Mooney of Canada, who is the executive director of the
Rural Advancement Foundation International ("RAM). Lambrecht, supra note 4, at Al.
RAFI often criticizes genetic engineering technologies and efforts by American companies
to export the United States system of patent protection around the world. See id. Indeed,
RAFI was very much opposed to the terminator technology. See Ricarda A. Steinbrccher
Patrick Mooney, Terminator Technology: The Threat to World Food Security, THE EcoLowsT,
Sept. 1, 1998, at 276.
7 See Bob Williams, "Terminator 7i,chnology" Could Curtail Brown-Bagging, NEWS & OB-
SERVER (Raleigh, NG), Nov. 8, 1098, at B7. The new technique consists of inserting an
array of new genes into a plant that, when sprayed with a chemical compound, turns oil a
"blocker" switch that normally allows the plant's seeds to be fertile. See Curt Anderson,
Discord Grows over Plant Patents—Sterile Seeds Protect Bideelts, Irk Farmers, SAN DIEGO UNION-
Min., May 24, 1998, at A8. Seeds with the terminator technology would produce crop
bearing plants, but the seeds produced by the plant would not able to germinate because
the "blocker" gene would not work. See id.
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seeds, use of the terminator technology would enforce these legal
protections. 8
News of the terminator technology, however, sparked heated con-
troversy around the globe. 9 Farmers planting seeds incorporating the
terminator technology would have to return to the commercial seed
market every year because they would no longer be able to save seed
from their harvests to plant the following year's crop."' As a result,
farmers would be unable to retain and replant the best seeds from
their crops and would be precluded from the traditional practice of
creating locally-adapted seed varieties. 11 Thus, farmers perceived the
terminator technology as interfering with a traditional and historical
right to save and replant seed." As such, the terminator technology
raised concerns over the scope of intellectual property protections for
genetically engineered seeds."
On October 4, 1999, in response to the widespread international
opposition of the terminator technology, the company planning to
acquire D&PL, Monsanto Co. ("Monsanto"), 14 declared that it would
never commercialize the terminator seed technology." Monsanto also
See Hawkes, supra Hole 3, at 20.
9 For example, in October 1998, at the World Bank in 'Washington, D.C., scientists mid
farm Ce011omists in the Consultative Croup on International Agriculture. which is the
world's largest agriculture research network, voted to condemn the technology and pro-
hibit it in their projects. See Lambrecht, supra note 4, at Al. In August 1998, India's agricul-
ture minister told the Indian Parliament that he had banned the importation of seeds
containing the terminator technology because of concerns that it would harm the coon-
try's agriculture. See Knight, supra note 5. In May 1998, the United Nations Conference of
the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity directed its scientific body to examine
the technology's impact on farmer's and biodiversity, and recommend that the "precau-
tionary principle" be applied to the new technology. See id.
19 See Knight, supra note 5. Fears about the terminator technology were especially
prevalent in developing countries, as a vast majority of the world's farmers still collect their
hest seeds each year and replant them the following year. See John Vidal, World Embraced For
Terminator 2, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 6, 1999, available in 1999 WL 25735652.
II See Knight, supra 'Lute 5.
12 See Frank Furhig, Haste, La Vista I3alry—Terminator Is Gone For Now, But It Could Br
Back Sr. J. REG. (Springfield, IL), Oct. 10, 1999, at 55.
13 See id.; Bill Lambrecht, "Terminator" Genes Render Seeds Simile—Armen No Longer Could
Save Them for Next Yeal ,—(1,S. Government Helped Develop It, ST, Louts PosT-DtsPATen, Apr.
10, 1998, at Al.
14 Monsanto was int ill dated with protests to the terminator technology despite the fact
that it Itas neither developed the technology nor held the patent for it at the titne of the
announcement. See The Trausgenic Sean; Tii.ms (India), Oct. 13, 1999, available in 1999 WL
28425544. The public. was aware, however, the Monsanto had been set to acquire D&PL,
which was enough to ignite worldwide protest against Monsanto. See id.
19 See Samuel K. Moore, Prminating the Terminatm; CHEMICAL WEEK, Oct. 13, 1999, at 9;
Wes Savidan, Terminator Genes: Fertility Rights, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 1099, at. 104. At the
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announced that it would not license the technology to other compa-
nies, but indicated that the company may use it internally for re-
search. 16
 Although Monsanto has promised to abandon any commer-
cial use of the terminator technology, this does not foreclose other
companies from using a similar seed sterilization technology in the
future."
This Note examines whether use of the terminator technology or
a similar sterilization technology would have expanded intellectual
property protections for genetically engineered seeds. Additionally,
this Note examines whether public property doctrines could recog-
nize a common law right to save and replant seeds. Part I of this Note
explores the development of the seed industry and genetically engi-
neered seeds in modern agriculture. 18
 Part II discusses how the legal
protection of intellectual property rights in genetically engineered
seeds can vary depending on whether the seed is subject to a patent,
protected by the Plant Variety Protection Act or sold through a licens-
ing agreement, and analyzes the effect that the terminator technology
would have on existing intellectual property protections available un-
der United States law. 19 Part III introduces and examines the applica-
tion of the various forms of public property rights that could enable
farmers to claim a right to save and replant seed. 29 Finally, Part IV dis-
cusses the balancing of competing values, interests and policy consid-
erations in the context of intellectual property protections for geneti-
cally engineered seeds.°
time the announcement was made, Monsanto's Chief Executive Officer explained that
"Though we do not own any sterile seed technology, we think it is important. to respond
by making clear our commitment not to commercialize gene protection systems that
render seed sterile." See &Milan, supra, at 104.
16 See Moore, supra note 15, at 9.
17 See Savidan, supra note 15, at 104. For example, one company has developed a seed
sterilization technology called the "verminator" technology. See Zeneca Pits Verminator
Against Terminatm; EcoNomic Tidies, Aug. 27,1908, available in 1098 WL 16762266. Like
the terminator technology, the verminator technology would render second generation
seeds sterile. See id. The only difference between the two technologies is iu the particular
genes that are altered. See id. The verminator technology incorporates a rat gene into a
plant seed to render seeds infertile. See id.
18 See infra notes 2'2-55 and accompanying text.
k 9 See infra notes 56-151 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 153-213 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 214-39 and accompanying text.
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I. GENETICALLY ENGINEERED SEEDS IN MODERN AGRICULTURE
A. A Brief History of the Development of the Seed Industry
Establishing a secure supply of food, both in quality and safety,
has been one of the primary driving forces in the world since the be-
ginning of humankind. 22 Guided by this impetus, farmers throughout
the centuries have selected varieties of seeds containing the most de-
sirable characteristics each planting cycle in order to plant in subse-
quent cycles." As a result, the genotnic composition of seed varieties
has been directly influenced by human intervention, rather than
through Darwinian natural selection. 24
Historically, the United States has lacked much in the way of na-
tive plant genetic resources for use in agriculture.25 Accordingly,
American agriculture has relied on access to and the use of plants in-
troduced into the United States from foreign countries. 28 The infu-
sion of new crop genetics, whether carried by immigrant farmers or
brought in by plant explorers working for the government, provided
the basis for the development of American agriculture and the
American seed industry. 27 Thus, most of the major crops grown in the
United States are not indigenous to North America. 28
Until about a decade ago, a majority of the development of crop
and seed throughout the world was accomplished mainly through
22 See Karen Lehman & Al Krebs, Control of the World's Food Supply, in THE CASE AGAINST
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AND FOR A TORN TOWARD TIM LOCAL 122, 123 ( Jerry Mander &
Edward Goldsmith eds., 1996).
23 See Danielle Knight, Agriculture; Agro-GianA Expand "Terminator" Seed Thchnology, IN-
TER PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 10, 1999, available in 1999 WL 5946975.
24 In The Origin of Species, Charles Darwin argued that present species of life had
evolved front ancestral species and proposed a mechanism for this evolution. which he
termed "natural selection." See NI IL A. CAMPBELL, BIOLOGY 399 (4111 ed. 1996). Natural
selection involves the interaction between the environment and the variability that is pres-
ent in any population, resulting in environmental factors favoring some characteristics
over others and these favored traits being disproportionately represented in the next gen-
eration. See id. at 407. Artificial selection occurs when humans, rather than the environ-
ment, select the individuals with the desired breeding characteristics. See id. The genotnic
composition of modern crops has been largely the result of artificial selection. See id,
25 See Neil D. Hatnilloti, il'ho Owns Dinner: Evolving Legal Mechanisms Jr Ownership of
Plant Genetic Resources, 28 TULSA L.J. 587, 607 (1993).
26 See id. Many American staple crops originated in other areas of the world, such as
corn, wheat. soybeans and potatoes. See id. Plants indigenous to the United States include
blueberries, cranberries, sunflowers, pecans, and black walnuts. See id. at 607-08.
27 See id. at 607.
28
 See Butte! & Belsky, SUpro note 1, at 113. •
632	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 41:627
governmental occupation. 29
 In the United States, plant research en-
tered the governmental realm with the establishment of the USDA in
the mid-nineteenth centUry. 30
 In conjunction with the nation's land
grant colleges and local agricultural organizations, the USDA guided
the development and testing of new varieties of seed and distributed
these seeds to farmers free of charge. 3 ' Through this governmental
influence, the practice of saving and trading seed in the agricultural
community became commonplace in order to develop new seed varie-
ties. 32
Seed development and research began to shift from the public
realm to the private sector with the development of hybridization dur-
ing the early twentieth century. 33
 In 1908, George Shull developed the
method of hybridization in order prevent farmers from saving seed
and allow breeders to capitalize on their development of new varieties
of seed." Breeding plants through the hybridization process involves
selecting and reproducing plants with favorable characteristics while
rejecting plants with undesirable traits. 35 Using hybrid crosses be-
tween various inbred lines, seed developers can sell seed that pro-
duces hybrid plants, but which in turn does not reproduce hybrids. 56
29 See Rick Weiss, Seeds of Discord; Monsanto's Gene Police Raise Alarm on Farmers' Rights,
Rural Tradition, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1999, at Al.
See Buttel & Belsky, supra note I , at 113.
Si See Weiss, supra note 29, at Al.
32 See id.
33 See Butte! & Belsky, supra note 1, at 114. The private seed industry began during the
middle of the nineteenth century, when a small private seed trade revolving around vege-
tables and flowers for home gardeners emerged. See id. at 113.
34 See Steinbrecher & Mooney, supra note 6, at 276.
St' See id.
56 See Lewontin, supra note 2, at 72. Hybrid seed varieties, of which corn is probably the
most prominent, have the distinct characteristic of not being able to maintain its vigor in
the next generation. Id. Hybrid seeds result from the interbreeding of two distinct and
distant parental lines of the same plant species. See Stcinbreclrer & Mooney, supra note 6,
at 276. The hybrid seeds that are produced will incorporate and express the desired ge-
netic waits of each parental line. See id. The offspring of these hybrid plants, however, will
not express the desirable genetic qualities of the parent hybrid seeds. See id. Thus, the
second generation are not true hybrids, resulting in plants with a loss of yield and in-
creased variability. See Loss-mars, supra note 2, at 72. The hybrid vigor is not transmitted to
the next generation, because undesirable recessive genes combine, and their unwanted
trait becomes expressive. See id. As a result of the substantial profits made by seed develop-
ers in the sale of hybrid corn seed, the hybrid method has been applied to other crops,
such as cotton, sunflowers and tomatoes. See id.
The hybrid method, however, cannot be applied to many seed innovations. See id.
First, the method cannot be made economically workable in many important crops like
soybeans and wheat. See id. Second, although the hybrid method has been successful for
increases in general yield, specific characteristics of a plant are not able to be incorporated
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Farmers producing crops from hybrid plants must purchase new seed
each year. 37
The traditional system of mainly governmental seed development
changed significantly with legislation passed by Congress during the
twentieth century that encouraged the growth of the private seed in-
dustry. For example, Congress enacted legislation in 1924 that ended
the free federal distribution of seeds to farmers and forced farmers to
rely on varieties offered by private seed companies. 38 Additionally, the
Plant Patent Act of 1930 and the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970
encouraged the trend towards the privatization of the seed industry
by providing intellectual property protections for seed developers."
Furthermore, Congress passed legislation in the 1980s that encour-
aged federal agencies to cooperate more closely with the private-
sector. 40 Private seed companies have been able to generate substan-
tial profits by selling seeds that were developed in conjunction with
the government:a
B. The Introduction of Genetically Engineered Seeds to Modern Agriculture
In recent years, advances in the genetic engineering of plants
have revolutionized the agriculture industry. 42 Scientists in both the
government and private industry have expended considerable effort
to understand more about the genetics of the plants hnportant to ag-
riculture and how to use genetic engineering to improve agricultural
quality and productivity. 43 Genetic engineering has made it possible to
snip, insert and recombine genes in order to edit and reprogram the
genetic makeup of plants."
into the seed through the hybrid method. See id. Third, the hybrid method is restricted by
the incompatibility of some plants that possess appealing characteristics with plants that
arc desired to be cultivated. See id.
37 See Lewontin, supra note 2, at 72,
38 See Buttel & Belsky, supra note 1, at 113.
39 See id, at 115-16.
41) See Weiss, supra note 29, at Al.
41 See id. Fbr instance, the terminator technology was developed by D&PL in conjunc-
tion with the USDA. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
as See David Ehrenfeld, A Techno-Pox Upon the Land (Negative Side-effects of the Green Revo-
lution and Agricultural Genetic Engineering), HARPER'S MAG., Oct. 1, 1997, at 13.
43 See CAMPBELL, supra note 24, at 390.
41 Id. at 411. The cells of plants have proven easier to genetically engineer than the
cells of many animals, because an adult plant can be regenerated from a single cell grown
in tissue culture. Id. zn 410. Commercially important plants that have been grown from
single cells include alfalfa, asparagus, cabbage, carrots, citrus fruits, potatoes, sunflowers,
tobacco and tomatoes. -Id.
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Even with modern advances in genetic engineering, however, the
altering of plant genomes has been a challenging endeavor." The
process of cloning plant DNA is generally straightforward, but identi-
fying particular genes of interest often proves to be very complex and
time-consuming." The basic concept behind genetic engineering is to
take a desirable gene from one species and insert the gene into an-
other species where it presumably will continue to have the desired
effect. 47
 This is often not the case, however." Gene expression can
change when a gene encounters a new genetic and cellular environ-
ment and result in the expression of previously-suppressed undesir-
able traits." Furthermore, many agriculturally desirable plant traits,
such as high crop yield, are extremely difficult to engineer genetically
because they involve multiple genes. 50
Despite these difficulties, many crops important to agriculture
have been successfully genetically engineered, mostly in cases where
the desired traits are determined by one or only a few geties. 51 As a
result of these scientific successes, the genetic engineering of agricul-
turally important crops has grown from a young science to a hot busi-
ness since the first genetically engineered seeds were introduced into
In order to genetically engineer plant cells, molecular biologists commonly use one of
two methods. See id. For some crops, such as corn, scientists insert genes into a single cell
using a DNA particle gun that fires .22 caliber plastic bullets tipped with tiny metal pellets
coated with DNA. See id. For other crops, such as cotton and soybeans, genes are carried
into the target cell through the use of a COMM011 soil bacteria (Agrobacteiam tumefaciens,t.
See id; Nelson Antosh, Seeds of Change—Genetically Engineered Crops Will Be Planted in More
Fields than Ever; Hous. CHRoN., Jan. 18, 1998, at 1. Taking advantage of the capacity to re-
generate whole plants from these single cells, plants then are grown from these genetically
engineered cells that contain and express the inserted gene. See CAMPBELL, supra note 24,
at 390.
45 See CAMPBELL, SUP/II note 24, at 390.
46 See id.
47 See Ehrenfeld, supra note 42, at 13.
48 See id.
49 See id. To alleviate the concerns of bioengineering in the United States, three federal
agencies share responsibility for setting policies and regulating new developments in ge-
netic engineering: the USDA, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and the Food
and Drug Administration ("FDA"). See Judith E. Beach, No "Killer Tomatoes": Easing Federal
Regulation of Genetically Engineered,Plants, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 181, 181 (1998). In the ab-
sence of legislation enacted with the specific intent of providing a federal agency or agen-
cies with the authority to regulate genetically engineered organisms, these three federal
agencies have taken the position that the existing laws are sufficient for the regulation of
genetically engineered organisms. See id. Pursuant to existing laws, the USDA, EPA and
FDA have promulgated stringent regulations and have established policies providing
specific guidelines for the regulation of genetically engineered organisms. See id.
50 See CAMPBELL, SUpra note 24, at 390.
51 See id. at 390-91.
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the commercial seed market.52 In 1998, approximately 50% of U.S.
cotton fields, 40% of soybean fields and 20% of corn fields were
grown with genetically engineered seeds." Farmers have made the
decision to plant genetically engineered seeds despite the high price
of the seed compared to traditional varieties." Indeed, genetically
engineered seeds appear to be changing the agricultural landscape as
we embark upon the new century."
II. USE OF THE TERMINATOR TECHNOLOGY 'CO ENFORCE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTIONS FOR GENETICALLY
ENGINEERED SEEDS
The development of genetically engineered crops and the prolif-
eration In the sale of genetically engineered seeds have raised con-
cerns for seed developers interested in protecting their biological in-
novations.56 The saving and replanting of seed by farmers has caused
significant concern because seed developers have spent enormous
amounts of time and financial resources to develop these genetically
engineered crop varieties. 57 Thus, intellectual property protections
are important to seed developers because they safeguard the invest-
ments made in developing new varieties of genetically engineered
seeds." •
52 &'e Scott Kilman & Susaii Warren, Food: Old Rivals Fight for Nato Turf, WALL STREET J.,
May 27, 1998, at Bl.
53
 See id.
1" See Antosh, supra note 44, at 1. In addition to the price charged for genetically engi-
neered seeds, some seed companies have charged "technology fees" to recover the sub-
stantial research costs of developing genetically engineered seeds. See Heather Scoffield,
Monsanto Draws Fire from Farmets—Patent Protection Tactics Controversial, GionE & MAIL (To-
ronto), Aug. 23, 1999, at 133. Other companies, however, have built their research costs
into the price of genetically engineered seed. See id.
" Genetically engineered seeds have had a substantial impact out agriculture despite
the warning of United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren E. Burger in 1980 "that
genetic research and related technological developments may spread imlIntion and dis-
ease, that it may result in a loss of genetic diversity, and that its practice may tend to depre-
ciate the value of human life." Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303. 316 (1980). Chief
Justice Burger suggested that "it is sometimes better 'to bear those ills we have than fly to
others that we know not of.'" Id.
56 See Butte] & Belsky, supra note 1, at 110.
See Ilawkes„urpra note 3, at 20; Lewon tin, supra note 2, at 72.
55 See infra Part 11.A.
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A. Intellectual Property Protections
When an individual 'expends intellectual power which results in
the creation of a new entity, such as genetically engineered seed, a
distinct property interest arises in that creation that is separate and
independent from physical ownership of that entity. 59 In the absence
of common law or statutory rights, however, an inventor's property
rights are limited to the physical entity that embodies the expenditure
of intellectual power. 69 As a result, others can freely imitate these in-
ventions. 61
The creation of statutory intellectual property rights has been the
legal answer to protect those who have expended considerable
amounts of time and energy in the creation of new varieties of seeds. 62
Intellectual property law restrains the free use and disposition of
property and vests in the creator the recognition of property rights in
the creation. 63
 In this sense, what makes inventions or creations valu-
able is not their specific physical embodiment, but rather the intellec-
tual protection of the physical embodiment. ► Indeed, the inventions
or creations that are most appealing to intellectual property protec-
tion are those that are easily duplicated. 65
The creation of statutory intellectual property rights is provided
for in the United States Constitution, which grants Congress the
power "[t] o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by se-
curing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 66
 The first legislation in
the United States to grant intellectual property rights to plant breed-
59 See D.F. Libling, The Concept of Property: Properly in Intangibles, 94 L.Q. R. 	 103, 104
(1978).
6° See Cheney Brothers v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S.
728 (1930).
61
 Sec id.
62 See Brine! & Belsky, supra note 1, at 113. Intellectual property is defined broadly as "a
category of intangible rights protecting commercially valuable products of the human
intellect." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 813 (7th ed. 1990).
63 See Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property and
the Public Domain, 18 CoLum.—VLA	 & ARTS 101, 266 (1994).
04 See id.
65 See Keith Aoki, Tice Stakes of Intellectual Properly Lan; in Tint POLITICS or LAW 265
(David Kairys ed., 3rd ed. 1998).
66 U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The first legislation implementing this provision, passed
in 1790, granted patent rights for mechanical inventions. See Yoder Brothers, Inc. v. Cali-
fornia-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1377 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1094
(1976).
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ers was the Plant Patent Act ("PPA"), enacted by Congress in 1930. 67
The PPA granted "the right to exclude others from asexually repro-
ducing the [patented] plant or selling or using the [patented] plant
so reproduced."68 The purpose behind the enactment of the PPA was
to "afford agriculture, so far as practicable, the same opportunity to
participate in the benefits of the patent system as has been given to
industry, and thus assist in placing agriculture on a basis of economic
equality with indusny."69 In promulgating the PPA, Congress allevi-
ated two concerns that were previously thought to preclude plants
from being applicable to patent law: first, the belief that plants were
products of nature and therefore not subject to patent protection;
and second, that plants were not considered amenable to the "written
description" requirement of patent law."
The PPA only provides protection for asexual varieties of plants,
which are plants reproduced through propagation or grafting," The
PPA, however, does not provide protection for sexual varieties of
plants, which are plants grown from seed. 72 Thus, the PPA does not
provide protection for genetically engineered seeds as these seeds are
produced from sexual varieties of plants. The original rationale for
restricting patent protection to asexually reproduced plants under the
PPA was the belief that new plant varieties could not be reproduced
reliably by seed. 73
In order to address the need for protecting intellectual property
rights in sexually reproduced plants, Congress enacted the Plant Vari-
ety Protection Act ("PVPA") in 1970. 74 As such, the PVPA provides one
method of intellectual property protection for seed developers to pro-
07 See Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560. 1563 (9111 Cir. 1995)
(citing S. REP. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d SeS's. 3 (1930)). At least as early as 18112, legislation
was proposed to grant plant breeders patcni rights for their inventions. See id. at 1562 (cit-
ing H.R. Rap. No. 5435, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. (1892)). Patent protection for plants was sup-
ported by many prominent individuals, including Thomas Edison, who slated that
"I nlothing that Congress could do to help farming would be of greater value and perma-
nence than to give to the plant breeder the same status as the mechanical and chemical
inventors now have through the law." See id. at 1563 (citing S. RY ,. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1930)).
69 SIT 35 U.S.C. § 163 (1994).
69 See Imazio, 69 F.3d at 1563 (citing S. Rep. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1930)).
7° See id.
71 See 35 U.S.C. g 161; see also CAMPBELL supra note 24, at C.3 (defining asexual repro-
duction).
72 See 35 U.S.C. § 161; see also CAMPBELL supra note 24, at C.27 (defining sexual repro-
duction).
See. Imazio, 69 F.3(1 at 1566.
Sce7 U.S.C. § 2581 (1994).
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tect genetically engineered seeds. The PVPA provides patent-like pro-
tection to sexually reproduced plant varieties which parallels the pro-
tection afforded asexually reproduced plant varieties under the PPA. 75
The PVPA was enacted "to encourage the development of novel varie-
ties of sexually reproduced plants and to make them available to the
public, providing protection available to those who breed, develop, or
discover them, and thereby promoting progress in agriculture in the
public interest." 76
The PVPA is administered by the Plant Variety Protection Office
("PVPO"), which is operated through the USDA. 77 The PVPO is
charged with the task of issuing certificates of protection to breeders
who apply for protection for their innovations. 78 The certificate grants
the breeder "the right, during the term of the plant variety protec-
tion, to exclude others from selling the variety, or offering it for sale,
or reproducing it, or importing it, or exporting it, or using it in pro-
ducing (as distinguished from developing) a hybrid or different vari-
ety therefrom."79
 Anyone violating the rights granted by the PVPA
certificate can be sued for infringement. 80 The protection provided by
a PVPA certificate lasts for a period of twenty years. 81 The PVPA has
played a significant role in encouraging the development of seed
breeding in the private-sector due to its cost-effectiveness and ease of
application.82
The protections available under the PVPA are restricted, how-
ever, by two significant limitations: the "research exemption" 83 and
the "crop exemption."84
 The "research exemption" allows other
breeders to use a protected seed variety in order to create new varie-
73 See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 181 (1905).
76 See H.R. Rep. No. 1605, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 84 Stat. 1542 (1970).
77 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321, 2323.
78 See id. § 2481. A plant variety must meet four requirements to qualify for PVPA pro-
tection: the variety must be 1) novel, 2) distinct, 3) uniform, and 4) stable. See id.
§ 2402(a). The applicant for the certificate must provide a description which is as "com-
plete as is reasonably possible" and which also includes breeding procedures and geneal-
ogy. See id. § 2422. Furthermore, the applicant must make a deposit of the seed for viability
testing. See id.
79 See id. § 2483(a) (1).
90 See id. § 2541.
81 See id. § 2483(6).
82 See Neil D. Hamilton, ll7ty Own the Farm If KM Can Own the Farmer (and the Crop?:
Contract Production and intellectual Property Protection of Grains, 73 NEB. L. Rev. 48, 95 (1994).
Since the passage of the PVPA in 1970, the USDA has issued over two thousand PVPA
certificates. See id.
-83
 See7 U S.C.§ 2544.
84 See id. § 2543.
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ties of the seed without the permission of the PVPA certificate
holder, 85 The "crop exemption" allows farmers to save seed from
crops grown from a PVPA protected variety of seed and use the seed
without compensating the owner of the protected variety. 88 Since the
enactment of the PVPA, the crop exemption has caused controversy
between farmers and the seed industry. 87 Although the crop exemp-
tion was included in the PVPA to allay fears that the legislation would
burden farmers—and ultimately consumers—with increased costs, it
was not intended to give farmers unlimited disposition to save and sell
protected varieties."
In 1995, in Ammo Seed Co. v. Winterboeo; the United States Su-
preme Court held that a farmer who met the requirements of the
crop exemption provision could engage in "brown-bag" sales of pro-
tected seed for reproductive purposes only and could sell only as
much seed as he had saved for the purpose of replanting his own
farm." In Asgrow, the plaintiff was the holder of PVPA certificates that
protected two varieties of soybean seed it had developed, 80 The de-
fendants operated a farm and raised these protected varieties, selling
brown-bagged versions of the seed to other farmers." The defendants
85 See id. § 2544.
86 See id. § 2543.
87 See, e.g., Argon), 513 U.S. 179 (tinier was engaged in sale of protected seeds varieties
to other farmers under the auspice (lithe crop exemption); Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Peo-
ples Gin Co., 694 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1983) . (non-prolit agricultural cooperative stored seed
from farmers harvest and distributed the protected seed based on the crop exemption).
88 See Delta & Pine, 694 F.2d at 1015-16.
89 See Asgrow, 513 U.S. at 192. A "brown-bag" sale derives its name from the process in
which farmers purchase seed bout a seed company, plant the seed in their own fields, har-
vest the crop, clean it and then sell the reproduced seed to other farmers in non-
descriptive brown bags. See id. at 181. Although brown-bag sales of protected seed varieties
may scent insignificant, the aggregate effect of these sales can significantly decrease a seed
company's profits. See Haniiiwn. supra note 25, at 632. One example of the substantial
effect that brown-bag sales can have on seed developers occurred in 1990, when Pioneer
Hi-Bred International ceased production of its red winter wheat variety in Kansas when it
discovered that. Only eight percent of the variety grown there had been raised from seed
actually purchased from Pioneer, with the illegal brown-bag market accounting for the rest
of that variety grown. See Hamilton, id. at 632 n.142 (citing Brief for Pioneer •i-Bred In-
ternational, Inc., as anticus curiae, Asgrow Seed Co. V. Winterboer, 982 F.2d 486 (80, Cir.
1992)).
5° See id. at 181.
81 See id. at 181-82. The defendants' sales were significant: dining 1990, they planted
265 acres of the protected soybean and sold the entire saleable crop of 10,529 bushels to
others for use as seed--enough to plant 10,000 acres. See id. at 182. Due to a concern that
the defendants were deriving substantial profits out of selling the protected soybean seed
varieties, Asgrow sent an agent to their farm and subsequently determined that the defen-
dants were indeed selling Asgrow's protected soybean variety. See id. at 182. As a result,
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did not dispute that they had engaged in sales of seed grown from
protected varieties, but rather argued that these sales were allowed
under the crop exemption of the PVPA.92 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, held that a farmer who meets the requirements as set forth in
the crop exemption provision may sell for reproductive purposes only
as much seed as he has saved for the purpose of replanting his own
fields."
Recognizing the adverse effect of brown-bag sales on the seed
industry, Congress narrowed the provision for sale of seed in the crop
exemption.94 Farmers now only may sell seed "for other than repro-
ductive purposes," which includes selling seed as a food product or
animal feed, but not for planting of new crops." Thus, sales similar to
those of the defendants in Asgrow are not allowed by the crop exemp-
tion, regardless of the amount sold.
In addition to the PVPA, utility patents provide another means of
intellectual property protection for genetically engineered seeds. 96
Utility patents provide protection for "any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and use-
ful improvement thereof."97 The purpose of granting patent rights to
inventors is to reward inventors for their contribution to "the useful
Arts" in exchange for their making the invention and providing pub-
lic disclosure of the invention.98
The Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), part of the Depart-
ment of Commerce, is responsible for the issuing of patents. 99 Utility
patents grant inventors a limited monopoly to make, use, offer for
sale or sell an invention throughout the United States. 199 Any person
violating the rights of a patent holder can be sued for infringementim
Asgrow sued the defendants, seeking damages and a permanent injunction to keep them
from selling the protected variety of seed. See id. at 182.
92 See id. at 183-84.
95 See A.sgrow,. 513 U.S. at 192.
94 See Plant Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-349,108 Stat.
3142,3144 (1994). 'the Supreme Court decided Asgrow shortly after the 1994 amendment
of the crop exemption, but before the effective date of the amendment. See Await), 513
U.S. at 184 11.2.
95 See l U.S.C. § 2543 (1994).
99 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
97 See id.
98 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Ex-
perimental Use, 56 U. Ctn. L. REv. 1017,1022 (1989).
" See 35 U.S.C. § 1.
100 See id. § 154.
101
 See id. § 271(b).
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Upon satisfying the requirements imposed by the Patent Act," the
scope of protection that utility patents provide can be quite expansive.
For instance, under the "doctrine of equivalents," patentees are pro-
tected from imitations of their inventions)" Additionally, patentees
are protected from inventors who independently come up with the
same invention)" Patents provide the inventor with protection for
their inventions for a period of twenty years from the date of filing for
the pateitt."
Utility patent protection for living inventions was first recognized
in 1980 in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, where the United States Supreme
Court held that living bacteria were patentable subject matter." In
Chakrabarty, a microbiologist sought to patent a bacterium that he in-
vented which was useful for cleaning oil spills because of its capacity
to break down crude ()Wm The patent examiner allowed patent
claims for the method of producing the bacteria and the process for
application of the bacteria, but rejected the claim for patenting the
bacteria itself on the ground that microorganisms are "products of
nature" and therefore not patentable under the statute." In deciding
the case, the Supreme Court reasoned that the bacteria sought to be
patented were "a product of human ingenuity 'having a distinctive
name, character [and] use,'" and were not naturally occurring living
matter." Thus, the Court held that genetically altered living organ-
isms were patentable as "manufactures" or "compositions of matter"
because human agency—through genetic engineering techniques—
effectively disqualified these organisms from being considered
naturally occurring. 110 As a result, Chakrabarty established that the
relevant distinction in patent law is • not between animate and
inanimate objects, but rather between products of nature and
products of human effort. 111
102 To receive a patent, an inventor must prove several elements in regard to their in-
vention: the invention must be (1) useful, (2) novel and (3) non-olwions. See id. §§ 101,
103(a). Additionally, upon issue of a patent, the patent holder must provide sufficient
information to enable "others skilled in the art" to create the invention. See id. §§111, 112.
1 °3 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
104 See MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 860-61
(1998).
105 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2).
106 See 447 U.S. 303,310 (1980).
107 See id. at 305.
108 See id, at 305-06.
100 See id. at 309-10 (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegman'', 121 U.S. 609,615 (1887)).
110 See id,
111 See447 U.S. at 313.
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The Chakrabarty decision greatly expanded the number of sub-
jects for patentability. 112 Additionally, in 1985, in Ex Parte Hibberd, the
Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals ruled that the princi-
ples of Chakrabarty could be extended to allow the patenting of ge-
netically engineered plants, seeds and plant tissue.'" In Hibberd, the
patent applicant sought a utility patent for maize plants that had been
genetically engineered to contain increased levels of free tryptophan,
an amino acid.n 4
 The patent examiner argued that because Congress
enacted two "plant-specific" statutes—the PPA and the PVPA—to pro-
vide specific intellectual property protection for plant breeders, the
intent of Congress was to exclude plants front utility patent protec-
6°10 15 The board of appeals, however, found there was no express
congressional intent indicating that the PPA and PVPA should pre-
empt utility patent protection for plants." 6 The board of appeals de-
termined that Congress enacted the plant-specific acts out of concern
that plants would not qualify for patent protection, not because Con-
gress thought plants were inherently unpatentable. 117 Thus, the board
of appeals concluded that genetically engineered plants, seeds and
plant tissue were patentable subject matter. 118 As a result of the Hib-
berd decision, genetically engineered seed varieties became eligible for
utility patents. 119 Thus, seed developers responded to the Hibberd deci-
sion by applying for patent protection for their genetically engineered
plants. 120
In addition to utility patent and PVPA protection, licensing
agreements provide intellectual property protection for genetically
engineered plants. It is currently standard practice in the seed indus-
try for a farmer who wishes to. purchase genetically engineered seeds
to sign a contract ("Technology Use Agreement") with a seed cont-
112 See Hamilton, supra note 82, at 91.
113 See 227 U.S.P.Q. 443, 443, 447-48 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1985).
114 See id. at 443.
"5 See id. at 444.
. 116 See id. at 445. The Board found that Congress originally enacted the PPA in 1930 to
combat two obstacles that plant breeders faced in obtaining intellectual property protec-
tion: 1) that plants were considered unpatentable "products of nature," and 2) that it was
difficult for new plant varieties to satisfy the Written description" requirement of palest
law. See id. at 445. Additionally, the Board stated that when Congress enacted the PVPA, it
believed that "it [did I not alter protection currently available within the patent system." See
id. at 445 (quoting S. REP No. 1246 at 3 (1970)).
117 See id, at 446.
118
 See Lfibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 443, 448.
119 See id. at 443, 448.
120 See Hamilton, supra note 82, at 91.
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patty in which rights are relinquished to seeds produced by the
crop. 121 Through licensing agreements, farmers not only agree to re-
frain from selling seed from the crop to other farmers (i.e. "brown-
bagging"), but more importantly, are prohibited front using the seed
harvested from a crop in subsequent growing seasons. 122 Thus, • licens-
ing agreements restrict the use of genetically engineered seeds to a
single growing season)" Furthermore, farmers who purchase geneti-
cally engineered seed under licensing agreements must return to the
seed company the next season if they desire to continue production
of those varieties: 124 Seed developers engaged in the sale of genetically
engineered seeds are able to use licensing agreements to gain better
protection than the PVPA or utility patents can offer. 125
To insure compliance with the licensing agreements, seed devel-
opers have hired investigators to search out violators. 126 Nonetheless,
farmers have breached their licensing agreements, either through
replanting or brown-bagging licensed varieties. 127
 Fear of legal action,
however, prevents many farmers from breaching the terms of their
licensing agreements. 128
121 See Lcwontin, supra note 2, at 72; Weiss, supra note 29, at Al.
122 See Lewon tin, supra note 2, at 72.
123 See id.
124 See id. For example, Monsanto requires that purchasers of its Roundup Ready seeds
agree to use them only once. See id. lb ensure that the seeds are only used once, Monsanto
includes a provision in the licensing agreement giving Monsanto the right for three years
after the purchase of the seed to enter and test a producer's farm in order to determine
whether Monsanto-grown seed had been planted. See Weiss, supra note 29, at Al.
125 See Lcwontin, supra note 2, at 72.
ISO For instance, Monsanto hires full-time Pinkerton investigators in the United States
and retired Mounted Police in Canada to deal with a growing caseload of violators. See
Weiss, supra note 29, at Al.
127 See Lewontin, supra note 2, at 72. Monsanto has reached hundreds of settlements
with farmers who have violated the terms of licensing agreements. See Weiss, supra note 29.
at Al. Many of these settlements have been in the range of teas or hundreds of' thousands
of dollars each. See id.
128 See Lcwontin, supra note 2, at 72. Monsanto has placed hill-page advertisements in
popular farming magazines in an eflOrt to prevent farmers from unlawfully using its prod-
uct:
When a farmer saves and replants Monsanto patented biotech seed, he un-
derstands drat what he is doing is wrong. And that, even if he did not sign an
agreement at the time he acquired the seed, he is committing an act of pi-
racy.... Furthermore, seed piracy could cost a Partner hundreds of dollars
per acre in cash settlements and legal fees, plus multiple years of on-farm and
business records inspection.
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B. The Effect of the Terminator Technology on Existing Intellectual Property
Protections
Genetically engineered seeds have created unique problems for
innovators interested in protecting the intellectual property rights
embodied in their inventions. The seed presents seed developers with
a simple biological obstacle—when a farmer plants a seed of a desir-
able variety, the seed will produce a plant that will produce more seed
of the particular variety. 129 Thus, when a farmer plants a genetically
engineered seed, the seed company has provided the farmer with a
free good—the altered genetic information contained in the seed—
which the farmer reproduces again and again in the practice of farm-
ing.'" Without intellectual property protections or a method to pre-
vent farmers from saving seed, the innovator of the genetically engi-
neered seed loses ownership and control over its intellectual
investment in the seed. 13 '
Intellectual property protections—either through utility patents,
the PVPA or licensing agreements—seek to restrict the free access and
replication of genetically engineered seeds. 02 Indeed, with massive
amounts of capital and research invested into the genetic engineering
of plants, seed developers have made considerable efforts to prevent
"seed piracy" and to protect the intellectual property rights in the ag-
ricultural products that they have created.'" The existing intellectual
protections, however, are not without deficiencies and have thus pre-
sented enforcement limitations for seed developers.
First, seeds pose significant problems for patent protection. Al-
though the Supreme Court's decision in Chakrabarty allowed innova-
tors to seek patent protection for genetically altered life forms,'"
seeds provide problems for utility patent property protection because
of their ability to recreate themselves and provide the consumer with
Id. Apparently, Monsanto has determined that the risk of alienating some farmers is com-
pensated for by the benefit of being able to promise "a level playing field." See Weiss, supra
note 29, at Al.
129 See Lewontin, supra note 2, at 72.
130 See id.
131 See lit.
132 See supra notes 74-128 and accompanying text.
13 For example, Monsanto estimates that it takes a period of ten years and about 300
million dollars to create commercial viable products of genetically engineered seeds. See
Weiss, supra note 29, at Al. Additionally, Monsanto claims that for every new kind of engi-
neered seed that makes it to field trials, 10,000 have failed somewhere along in the devel-
opmental process. See id.
134 See 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).
May 20001	 In the Aftermath of the "Terminator" Technology Controversy 	 645
. a potentially unlimited supply of the patented seed. When a farmer
purchases genetically engineered seed and plants this seed, the result-
ing plants produce more patented genetically altered seed. Thus, the
farmer who plants seed gathered from a plant grown from a patented
seed variety is in essence receiving a free "copy" of the patented vari-
ety of seed.
The question of whether farmers raising crops from patented
seed are able to save or sell any of the crop for seeding purposes with-
out infringing the patent is subject to debate. 135 According to the
"first sale" doctrine of patent law, the right of the patentee to limit
sales ends when the patented item is sold. 136 The first sale doctrine
arguably could be applied to include patented varieties of seed sold to
farmers, thus foreclosing seed developers from suing fanners for pat-
ent infringement when a fanner saves and replants patented varieties
of seed.'"
Seeds also pose significant problems to the PVPA, because of the
crop exemption that allows farmers to save seed for subsequent grow-
ing seasons. 138 Although the crop exemption was amended to narrow
its applicability, seed developers may continue to encounter difficulty
recapturing their research and development investment for seed va-
rieties protected under the PVPA. 139 While the main body of the PVPA
grants developers of novel varieties of seeds the exclusive right to re-
produce the variety, the crop exemption weakens this exclusive right
by permitting farmers to save and plant seed produced from PVPA
protected varieties without liability.140 Farmers no longer are allowed
to sell saved seed for reproductive purposes, but they still are allowed
to use protected seed for replanting."' Thus, every time a farmer uses
saved seed to replant their fields, the seed developers lose a potential
sale of new seed. As such, the PVPA allows farmers to use protected
varieties of seed every year, having paid for it only once with the initial
135 There are some scholars, however, who believe that because the Patent Ad does not
have a "crop exemption" like that of the ITPA and that Partners do not have a right to save
seed under the Patent Act. See, e.g., Peter J. Goss, Guiding the Hand that Feeds: Toward Socially
Optimal Appropriabilily in Agricultural Biotechnology Innovation, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1395, 1400
(1996); Hamilton, supra note 82, at 101.
150 SeeAdams v. Bsirke , 84 U.S. 953, 456-57 (1873).
157
 See id.
138 See7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1994).
1 " See Hamilton, supra note 82, at 95.
I " See Delta & Pine, 694 F.2(1 at 1016.
1 ' See 7 U.S.C. § 2543.
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purchase. 192 Indeed, the crop exemption appears to be at odds with
the primary purpose of the PVPA." 3
Furthermore, licensing agreements pose problems for seed de-
velopers who seek to reinforce the patent and PVPA protection avail-
able for seeds. 144 Although licensing agreements provide the benefit
of overriding the, "crop exemption" of the PVPA and the "first sale"
doctrine of patent law, the effectiveness of these agreements is se-
verely limited by the enormous monitoring costs that they demand. 146
Thus, licensing agreements are only as effective as the means to catch
violators and as a result, the agreements provide protection only to
the extent that they can be enforced. 146
Considering the intellectual property protections available to
seed developers and the problems with enforcing such protections,
the terminator technology would be an extremely effective method of
enforcing the intellectual property rights in genetically engineered
seeds. In essence, the terminator technology would make concrete
what seed developers have sought through licensing agreements. Cur-
rently, seed companies only offer genetically engineered seed varieties
to farmers through licensing agreetnents. 147 Seed developers, through
licensing agreements, have attempted to forbid the use of the licensed
seeds in subsequent growing seasons and ensure that farmers pay
each time they plant protected genetically engineered seed.'" Seeds
incorporating the terminator technology would bear plants that pro-
duce only sterile seeds, thereby limiting use of the seeds to one grow-
ing season. 149 Thus, seeds incorporating the terminator technology
would eliminate the need to monitor farmers to enforce licensing
agreements. 16° Furthermore, if farmers wanted to replant genetically
engineered seed, the terminator technology would ensure that farm-
ers compensated seed developers each time they plant protected ge-
netically engineered seed. 151
142 see id .
143 See Delta 49' Pine, 694 F.24 at 1016.
144 See Hamilton, supra note 82, at 92.
115 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
Ha For instance, although the computer industry has used licensing to enhance the
patent and copyright protection of computer software, infringement of the licenses has
heen difficult to detect. See generally, Mark Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkierap Li-
censes, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1239 (1995).
117 See Lesvon fin, supra note 2, at 72; Weiss, supra note 29, at Al,
148 See Lewontin, supra note 2, at 72.
"8 See Knight, supra note 5.
150 See Weiss, supra note 29, at Al.
151 See Knight, supra note 5.
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Ill. ANALYSIS OF THE CLAIM OF A COMMON LAW RIGHT TO SAVE AND
REPLANT SEED
Although use of the terminator technology would enforce the
intellectual property protections of seed developers, farmers have
claimed that they have a right to save and replant seed. 152 Ever since
humans began the transition froth nomadic herders to farmers, saving
seed for planting the following year's crop has been a basic tenet in
the practice of agriculture. 153 By selecting seeds with the most desir-
able traits from each year's harvest, farmers perpetuate the desirable
characteristics in the next generation of the seeds, such as increased
yield and ability to resist disease. 154 Farmers view the practice of saving
and replanting seed as a historical and traditional right. 155 Public
property law rights are important because these rights could provide
farmers with a common law claim to save and replant seed. 156
A. Public Property Rights
Property law affects the rights and relationships among people
with respect to the control, use and transfer of valued resources. 157
The law of property determines; both the allocation and scope of in-
terests in these resources. 158 Property rights involve many different
kinds of interests and social contexts. 1" As such, the extent of legal
protection varies depending on the interest being protected and the
context in which social conflict .about the interest arises. 160 Property
rights, however, are not absolute. 161 Ownership of property does not
entitle a person to sole control and use of the property in total exclu-
sion of others. 162 Rather, property is more properly characterized as
containing a number of distinct rights. 163 These rights include the
152
 SeeFttrhig, supra note 12, at 55.
153 See Laurent Belgie, Plants Without Seeds Challenge Historic Fanning Practices, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, July 30,1998, at B4.
154 S:reAlnned, supra note 6, at 6.
155 See Furhig, supra note 12, at 55.
156 See infra Part H.B.
157 ,See josEion WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES xli
(1997).
11.1/ See id.
159 See Id. at xlii.
16° See id.
161 See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KluER, PROPERTY 86 (3d ed. 1993).
162 See id.
163 See id.
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right to possess, the right to use, the right to exclude and the right to
transfer. 164
Public property rights can greatly limit private ownership of an
entity and can be significant in scope. 165 The common law of property
in the United States defines many instances requiring access to prop-
erty be shared among many parties, even though a formal agreement
between the parties is lacking. 166 In certain circumstances, the legal
system allows the general public as a whole to possess a property in-
terest in privately owned entities. 167 In many instances, rights of access
to property are shifted after a period of shared use. 168 In other in-
stances, non-owners are given access to private property, regardless of
any previous use. 169
One example of a public property right is a prescriptive ease-
ment.'" In most states, the public is able to obtain a prescriptive
easement in land under a claim of right through its long continuous
use. 171 To meet the requirements of a prescriptive easement, the
owner of the property must be put on notice that an adverse right of
possession is being claimed by the general public. 172 The extent of the
property rights that the public acquires under a prescriptive easement
claim depends on the magnitude of the adverse use.'"
Another example of a public property right is the public trust
doctrine. 174 The public trust doctrine recognizes a public right of ac-
cess to private property in order to effectuate the need for public use
161
 See id.
Ka See infra notes 170-85 and accompanying text.
166 See Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 611, 665
(1987).
167 See infra notes 170-85 and accompanying (ext.
168 See Singer, supra note 166, at 665.
166 See id.
170
 One instance of where a public prescriptive easement could be claimed is for a pri-
vately owned road that has been under a long continuous use by the public. Thus, in
Rockefeller Center in New York City: to prevent a public prescriptive from being claimed
in a publicly used, but privately owned roadway, the street is closed for all uses for one day
each year in order to break the long continuous use by the public. See DUKEMINIER &
KRIER, 5aPIR note 161, at 826n.14..
171 SeeDUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 161, at 826.
172 see id .
173 See Singer, supra note 166, at 669.
174 See, e.g., Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 57 Conn. App. 712 (2000) (applying public
trust doctrine to provide noninhabitants of the Town of Greenwich access to its public
parks and beaches); Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (NJ. 1984)
(applying public trust doctrine to give nonresidents both access to and use of privately
owned dry sand areas).
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of the property. 175 The public trust doctrine has been applied in states
that contain seacoast, where the availability of coastal beaches for
public use is a matter given considerable importance. 178 The premise
of the public trust doctrine is that "the ownership, dominion and sov-
ereignty over land flowed by tidal waters, which extend to the mean
water mark, is vested in states in trust for the people: 177 The public
trust doctrine is based on the belief that fundamental things in na-
ture—such as air, running water, the ocean and the seashore—are
common to humankind, and thins, access to these things cannot be
forbidden. 178
A further example of a public property right is the doctrine of
customary rights.'" The doctrine of customary rights grants the pub-
lic an interest in private property where the public has relied both on
access to the property in the past and on the private owners having
allowed such use in the past. 18° In a few jurisdictions, courts have ap-
plied the doctrine of customary rights in beaches used by the pub-
lic. 181 In these situations, the public is granted a customary right to
use the beaches if the public has used the beach and the dry sand
area subject to private ownership for so long that "the memory of
man runneth not to the contrary:182
In addition to public prescriptive easements, the public trust doc-
trine and customary rights, a common law public property right is
1 " See Singer, supra note 166, at 674.
176 SeeDutivimNtER & KRIER, supra note 161, at 826. Although the dry sand portion of
beaches bordering the ocean is subject to private ownership, the public mist doctrine has
been enlarged to give access to the pnhlic and use of privately-owned dry sand area as ma-
suitably necessary. See Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365.
177 See Matthews, 471 A.2d at 358.
176
	 id. at. 360.
175
	
1969, in Slate es rel. Thorton n Hay, the Oregon Supreme Court applied the doc-
trine of customary rights to property in that state, holding that after years of use by the
public, a public property right had been acquired for recreational use of previously pri-
vately owned coastal beaches in the state. See 462 P.2d 671,677-78 (Or. 1969). In Morton,
the court applied the doctrine of customary rights to protect the public's interest in prop-
erty where the public had relied both on prior access to the beach property and on the
private owners' acquiescence in allowing Such use of the property. See id. at 678. Thus, the
court found that the public. had used the coastal beaches for generations, and that as a
result, the public had a customary right to use the beaches. See id. at 677-78.
180 See Thorton, 462 P.2d at 677.
181 See, e.g., City of Daytona Beach v. Tona•Rama, Inc., 294 So.2d 73 (Ha. 1974) (hold-
ing that the general public could continue to use the dry sand area for recreational pur-
poses because rights had been granted through customary use); Matcha v. Mattox, 711
S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981i) (holding that public had acquired a right of use in
beaches even though a hurricane hacl moved the natural line of vegetation).
182 See Thorton, 462 P.2d at 677.
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recognized where the pliblic has acted in reliance of access to certain
private properties.'" The doctrine of public reliance is premised on
the belief that private property owners have an obligation to allow ac-
cess to their property when they have opened their property to others
on prior occasions. 184 The obligation to open private property to non-
owners is done to effectuate public policy considerations.I 85
An additional example of a public property right is the commu-
nity property claim. A community property right based on a long es-
tablished relationship, however, has never been recognized in the
United States. 186
 In 1980, in Local 1330, United Steel Workers of America V.
United States Steel corp., the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit rejected a claim for community property tights derived
from a long established relationship between the community and the
cmporation. 187
 In Local 1330, the plaintiffs, who were employees of
the defendant steel corporation, sought to force the defendant either
to keep operating two plants it planned on closing or to sell these
plants to the plaintiffs.'" The defendant steel corporation had oper-
ated in the area for almost seventy years, becoming a dominant factor
in the lives of its thousands of employees and their families, and an
institution in the life of the city where the plants were located. 189 The
plaintiffs asserted that a long-standing relationship was in existence
between the community and the corporation from which a property
right had been created.'" The court concluded, however, that there
was no legal authority that recognized a community property right
arising from the long established relationship between the community
and the corporation. 191
185 See Singer, supra note 166. to 676.
184 See id. at 675. Thus, in 1971, in State t Shack, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held
that a farm owner who employed migrant farm workers and let them live on his land could
not prevent these farm workers from having guests. See 277 A.2d 369,374 (NJ. 1971). The
court reasoned implicitly that the farm owner had functionally relinquished part of his
right to exclude others from his property once he had opened his property to the migrant
farm-workers. See id. The court stated that the right of access in this case rested on the
fundamental rights of the farm workers and their relative vulnerability. See id. at 374-75.
Thus, the court created a public property interest by which the farm workers were allowed
to receive guests on the private property of the farm owner. See id. at 374.
189 See Singer, supra note 166, at 675.
180 See, e.g., Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d
1264 (6th Cir. 1980) (rejecting a claim of community property rights).
187 See id. at 1279-82.
1 s9 See id. at 1265-66.
189 See id. at 1265.
199 See id. at 1280.
191
 See Local 1330, 63l F.2(1 at 1282.
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B. The Application of Public Property Doctrines to Claim a Right to Save and
Replant Seed
Currently in the United States there is no legislative codification
that recognizes the inherent right of farmers to save seed. 192 At first
glance, the crop exemption of the PVPA may appear to represent the
codification of the "historical and traditional right of small farmers"
to save seed, 193 This, however, is not the case. 194 Although the title of
the PVPA crop exemption of the PVPA reads "Right to save seed; crop
exemption," 195 the Supreme Court has stated explicitly that the crop
exemption of the PVPA "does not, as that title claims and the ensuing
text says, reserve any Might to 'save seed'—since nothing elsewhere
in the Act remotely prohibits the saving of seed." 196
In the context of the terminator controversy, it was claimed that
seed is a common resource of all humankind and thus, farmers have
an inherent right to save and replant seed. 197 Indeed, farmers' rights
in seeds have been thought of as "an expression of the contribution of
farming communities to their innovative capacity as breeders, users
and managers of biodiversity." 198 Although the present genetic
makeup of most life forms was determined by nature, farmers have
contributed greatly to the genetic makeup of crops through the selec-
tion of the best seeds in each generation of crop. 199 The principal le-
gal argument made in opposition to the terminator technology is that
it would take away the inherent, right of farmers to save seed for fu-
ture plantings. 200 To recognize the right to save and replant seed,
however, requires the acknowledgement of a property interest in the
Might to save and plant seed that is harvested.
192 See, e.g., Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 186 (explaining ilia( the
I'VPA "does not, as that title claims and the ensuing text says, reserve any '[might to save
seed'—since nothing elsewhere in the Act remotely prohibits the saving of seed.").
o' See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 795 F. Stipp. 915, 918 (N.1). Iowa 1991), reti'd,
982 F,2d 486 (8th Cir. 1992), read, 513 U.S. 179 (1995).
194 See Asgrow, 513 U.S. at 186.
195 See 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1994) (emphasis added).
196 See Asgrow, 513 U.S. at 186.
I" See Devincla Sharmer, The Denton Seeds: From the U.S. Comes the Terminator, A Seed Thai
Become Sterile After Just One Crop—As Seed Companies Prepare to Reap a Windfall, Who Will
Protect the Farmer?, Bus. LINE, July 24, 1998, available in 1998 in 12718092.
198 See id.
199 See supra note 23-24 and accompanying text. One commentator has argued that
farmers should have the right to benefit from their direct influence on the biological re-
sources of agriculture, and that the "right to save, exchange and improve seeds is, there-
fore, inalienable." See Shariner, supra note 197.
200 See Sharmm supra t hole 197.
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A common law property right for farmers to save seed is difficult
to recognize under any of the public property doctrines because these
doctrines traditionally are limited in application only to instances in-
volving real property. 201
 For instance, prescriptive easements have
been applied to give the public access to land, 202 the public trust and
customary rights doctrines have been applied to give the public access
to beaches, 208 and the reliance doctrine has been applied to require
owners to open access to real property where the public has relied on
access in the past. 204 In order for a property interest in the right to
save and replant seed to be protected under the umbrella of any of
the public property doctrines, these doctrine would need to be ex-
panded significantly to included personal property, as well as real
property. 205
Even if the public property doctrines were expanded to cover
personal property as well as real property, many of these doctrines
require the property to have been used by the public for long periods
of time.206
 For instance, a prescriptive easement requires a long con-
tinuous use of property by the public,207
 the doctrine of customary
rights requires the public use of a property for so long that "the
memory of man runneth not to the contrary", 208 and the reliance
doctrine requires access to private property where non-owners have
relied on access to the property in the past.209
 In the United States,
the long continuous practice of saving seed and planting in subse-
quent growing seasons has been severely restricted through both the
use of hybrid seed varieties and the modern use of license agreements
for genetically engineered. seed , 210
Finally, the creation of a common law right to save and replant
seed neglects the fact that there is a lack of precedent to create such a
201 See supra Part IH.A.
202 See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
2°3 See supra notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
2'34
 See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
2°5
 Although these public property doctrines could be judicially expanded to include
seeds used in agriculture, these rights would only be able to be enforced on a state-by-state
COMMOlk law basis.
2°6 See supra Part HIA.
2°7 See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
2°8 State ex rel. Thorion v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 677 (Or. 1969).
209 See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
210 See supra notes 33-37,121-25.
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right. 211 As was the case in Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United
States Steel Corp, there appears to be no constitutional, legislative or
judicial authority to create a common law property right based on the
contribution of farmers to the genetic makeup of modern crops. 212 As
such, the assertion that farmers have an inherent right to save seed
appears tenuous at best, 213
IV. THE BALANCING OF COMPETING VALUES, INTERESTS AND POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE TERMINATOR TECHNOLOGY
The formidable issue that the terminator technology brought to
the forefront of the bioengineering debate today is the notion that
the claim of a right to save and replant seed is not compatible with the
private monopoly control of intellectual property rights. 214 Indeed,
the advocacy of farmers' rights seeks to end the inequality in the cur-
rent recognition and reward systems that favor intellectual property
inventions over the contributions of farmers to the genetic resources
available hi crops today. 215 As such, recognizing the impact the farm-
ers have had on the genotnic development of the crops would require
a significant change in the existing property laws of the United
States. 216
In determining whether to adopt changes to existing property
laws, the changes should not be implemented if they are restrictive
and add nothing to the social welfare. 217 If the changes are restrictive
but contribute some benefit to the social welfare of society, however,
the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed changes must be
weighed against each other to determine whether such actions should
be taken. 218 Although this approach may not furnish a precise guide,
it provides an approach that addresses questions of social values, while
respecting the notion of private property. 219 Thus, in order to deter-
mine whether a farmer's right to save and replant seed should be en-
211 See, e.g., Asgrow, 513 U.S. at 186 (explaining that the PVPA "does not, as that title
claims and the ensiling text says, reserve any ' iglu to save seed'—since nothing else-
where in the Act remotely prohibits the saving of seed.").
212 See 631 F.2d 1264, 1282 (6th Cir. 1080).
212 See id.
214 SeeSharmer, supra note 197.
215 ,5 M.S. S•atmtinathan, The	 Giving the Farmer His Due, ME Elmou,
Aug. 23, 1998, available in 1998 WI., 15912460.
216 See supra Part
217 Seel RICHAnO POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL Pitomirry 33, 34 (1949).
21R See id,
219 See id,
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forced over a seed developer's intellectual property rights, we must
balance the competing values, interests and policy considerations in
the context of genetically engineered seeds. In doing so, we must de-
cide which interests to protect and which interest to leave unpro-
tected. 22°
First, changing the law to recognize a common law right of farm-
ers to save and replant seed acknowledges the contributions that
farmers have made to the genomic composition of crops. Farmers
throughout history have selected seeds from crops having the most
desirable characteristics from each planting cycle to use in future
planting cycles. 22 ' The history of American seed development by the
importation and cultivation of both indigenous and non-domestic
seed varieties suggests that all farmers should have full and open ac-
cess to crop genetics. 222
Additionally, recognizing a common law tight to save and replant
seed guarantees that farmers Continue this traditional and historical
practice in agriculture. Saving seed to use in planting the following
year's crop has been a basic tenet in the practice of agriculture since
humans began farming. 223
 Recognition of a common law right to save
and replant seed would guarantee that farmers "have the ability to
fine tune seed quality to the agroclimatic characteristics of their
fields. "224
Furthermore, recognition of a common law right to save and re-
plant seed also protects farmers against seed developers. Any technol-
ogy that provides the ability to genetically alter seeds so that the crops
produced from these seeds will in turn bear sterile seeds has
significant potential for abuse. Indeed, farmers feared that seed de-
velopers would offer only seeds incorporating the terminator tech-
nology.225
 Recognizing a common law right to save and replant avoids
the potential inequities of farmers being forced to purchase seed each
planting season.
Recognizing a common law property right to save and replant
seed, however, makes intellectual property protections in this area
229 See Singer, supra note 166, at 648.
221 See Knight, supra note 23.
222 See Hamilton, supra note 25, at (108.
223 See Belsie, supra note 153, at 134.
224 SeeAhmed, supra note 6, at 6.
223 Seed developers have claimed that they would not force any farmer to purchase
genetically engineered seeds with the terminator technology and that farmers will be free
to save traditional seeds if they prefer. See Knight, sepia note 23.
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insignificant. The Supreme Court's decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty
opened the doors for patent protection of genetically altered life
forms. 226 Additionally. , the decision in Ex parte Hibberd specifically al-
lowed for the patenting of plants. 227 Recognizing a common law right
to save and replant seed establishes a system of intellectual property
protection in the United States that is strong in theory, but unen-
forceable in practice. The very purpose of intellectual property pro-
tections is to restrain the free use and disposition of property,228
Without the protection of intellectual property laws, anyone who pur-
chases bioeugineered seed is free to grow more seed for there own
use or to sell to other fanners. 229 In fact, fanners who save and replant
bioengineered seed are likely to reap greater economic benefits
therefrom than the seed developers, since farmers are not burdened
with the costs incidental to the development of the invention.
Recognizing a common law right to save and replant seed also
diminishes the incentive seed developers have in developing new va-
rieties of seed. With massive amounts of capital and research invested
into the genetic engineering of plants, seed developers have made
considerable efforts to prevent "seed piracy" and to protect the intel-
lectual property rights in the agricultural products that they have cre-
ated. 2" Unless seed developers receive compensation in some form
from farmers receiving a continuous supply of genetically engineered
seed by perpetual replication, seed developers can only hope to reap
the rewards of their investment in research and development if they
are allowed to restrict free access. 231 It is only natural that companies
that have invested millions of dollars in developing new technologies
will want to take whatever steps necessary to enforce the intellectual
property rights in genetically engineered seeds. Seed developers have
little motivation to introduce a product in a market where it is inevi-
table that the product will be pirated. 252 Without the ability to
efficiently enforce intellectual property protections, it simply may be
easier and perhaps more cost effective not to introduce the geneti-
cally engineered seed. 2" In this regard, the availability of statutory
226 See447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).
227 See 227 U.S.P.Q 443, 443, 447, 448 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1985).
228 See Aoki, -supra note 63, at 266.
229 See Cheney Brothers v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, '280 (1929), cert. denied, 281
U.S. 728 (1930).
250 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
231 See But tel & Belsky, supra note 1, at 110.
232 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
253 See supra note 127 ainl accompanying text.
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intellectual property protections are meaningless when the protec-
tions are easily violated. As paradoxical as it may sound, the termina-
tor technology actually may enhance access to seeds, rather than re-
strict it, by encouraging seed developers to develop new varieties of
seed that might otherwise never have come into existence had protec-
tions been difficult to enforce. Indeed, proponents of the terminator
technology claimed that it would promote research on staple crops,
especially those crops that companies were discouraged from invest-
ing in because they were unprofitable. 234
Critically, recognizing a common law right to save and replant
seed ignores the fundamental teaching of property law that the right
to exclude others is the very essence of property. 233 As such, patents
have been long considered a species of property.236 In this regard,
seed developers should be able to assume that they may control, for
purposes beneficial to themselves, what they have discovered and ap-
propriated to their own use, what they have created by their own ef-
fort and what they have acquired under the existing social and eco-
nomic order."237 Incorporating the terminator technology into
genetically engineered seeds to serve as .technological barrier is
analogous to the use of the hybridization method in seeds. 238 Much
like the terminator technology, the hybrid method was developed to
prevent farmers from saving seed and allow breeders to capitalize on
their development of new varieties of seed. 239 As farmers have had to
decide whether hybrids were worth the cost of purchasing each year,
they would have to decide if genetically engineered seeds incorporat-
ing the terminator technology are worth the cost of purchasing new
seed each year.
Thus, in balancing the competing values, interests and policy
considerations in the context of the terminator technology, the intel-
lectual property rights of seed developers should be favored over any
claimed right to save and replant seed. As long as seed companies of-
fer traditional varieties of seed that do not have seed sterilization
technology, farmers will be allowed to continue the traditional and
239 See Knight, sepia note 5.
233 lit renter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
236 See Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 197 (1856) (Tor, by the laws of the
United States, the rights of a party under a patent are his private property"); cf. Consoli-
dated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876) ("A patent for an invention is as stanch
property as a patent for I:111(r).
237
 RoscoE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION To THE PIIILOSOPHY or LAW 192 (1922).
239
	 Vidal, supra note 10, at 4.
239 See Steinbrecher & Mooney, supra note 6, at 276.
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historical practice of saving and replanting seed. If farmers use ge-
netically engineered seed, the terminator technology or a similar ster-
ilization technology in genetically engineered seed would allow seed
developers to prevent seed piracy, would allow for the enforcement of
existing intellectual property rights and would maintain the economic
incentives for seed developers in producing new genetically engi-
neered seed varieties.
CONCLUSION
In the practice of farming, saving seed has been a basic tenet in
order to use the seed to plant the following year's crop. The introduc-
tion of the terminator technology, however, threatened to end this
traditional and historical practice. Farmers planting seeds with the
terminator technology would be forced to return to the commercial
seed market every year since the seed produced from crops with the
terminator technology would be infertile. Accordingly, the terminator
technology triggered a debate over the scope of property interests in
genetically engineered seeds.
Advocacy of the right of farmers to save and replant seeds
conflicts with the current reward and recognition systems that favor
intellectual property inventions over the rights of the original cultiva-
tors of modern agriculture. Additionally, recognizing a public prop-
erty right in seeds would require the common law public property
doctrines be expanded significantly. Furthermore, although it may be
argued that the terminator technology would expand the scope of
intellectual property protections of genetically engineered seeds, the
technology Merely enforces what seed developers have attempted to
accomplish through licensing agreements.
The use of the terminator technology or a similar sterilization
technology in genetically engineered seed would allow seed develop-
ers to prevent seed piracy and control what they have created through
their own effort. Additionally, it would allow for the enforcement of
existing intellectual property rights and maintain the incentives in
producing new genetically engineered varieties of seed. As long as
traditional varieties of seed are offered without seed sterilization
technology, seed companies should be free to restrict access to their
biological innovations.
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